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Subject:                                Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up - Jan 17

 

Wolters Kluwer

Antitrust Law Daily

January 17, 2017

Wolters Kluwer

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CASES

 

NEWS

In the News

LAW FIRMS

·        Covington & Burling LLP

·        Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP [1, 2]

·        Erise IP, PA

·        Fidelity National Law Group

·        Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP

·        Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP

·        L.M.T Law Firm

·        Law Office of Tina L. Sherwood

·        McDowell, Rice, Smith & Buchanan, PC

·        Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP

·        Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP

·        Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP

·        Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

·        The Ghilezan Law Firm

·        Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

COMPANIES

·        American Brokers Conduit

·        American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.

·        Apex Mortgage Services

TOP STORY

TOP STORY: Qualcomm faces FTC monopolization allegations over licensing of SEPs

By Jeffrey May, J.D.

Qualcomm Inc. unlawfully maintained its monopoly in a type of semiconductor device that enables cellular communications in cell phones and other products by, among other things, consistently refusing to license standard-essential patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, or "FRAND," terms to competing suppliers of these baseband processors, according to a complaint filed today by the FTC in the federal district court in San Jose, California. In a two-to-one vote, the Commission authorized the filing. The agency said in a statement that the company’s sales and licensing practices hamper Qualcomm’s competitors and threaten innovation in mobile communications. The agency is seeking an injunction against Qualcomm "to undo and prevent its unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce" (FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., FTC File No. 141 0199, Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-00220).

Qualcomm has long been the leading supplier of baseband processors worldwide, according to the FTC’s complaint. The agency defined baseband processors as semiconductor devices (sometimes referred to as "chips," "chipsets," or "modems") within handsets. They allow handsets to communicate with an operator’s cellular network by performing functions such as signal generation, modulation, and encoding.

According to the agency, Qualcomm has participated in cellular standard setting processes through various standard setting organizations (SSOs) and has committed to the SSOs that it would license certain cellular standard-essential patents or SEPs on FRAND terms. The FTC is challenging Qualcomm's alleged efforts to condition the supply of baseband processors on licenses to FRAND-encumbered patents on Qualcomm’s preferred terms. Moreover, Qualcomm has allegedly refused to license FRAND-encumbered SEPs to its competitors. In addition, the company purportedly extracted baseband processor exclusivity from Apple in exchange for partial royalty relief.

Dissent. FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, the lone Republican on the Commission, voted against authorizing the litigation. Ohlhausen took the unusual step of writing a dissenting statement.

The commissioner said that the enforcement action was "based on a flawed legal theory (including a standalone Section 5 count) that lacks economic and evidentiary support, that was brought on the eve of a new presidential administration, and that, by its mere issuance, will undermine U.S. intellectual property rights in Asia and worldwide."

Ohlhausen added that she had "been presented with no robust economic evidence of exclusion and anticompetitive effects, either as to the complaint’s core ‘taxation’ theory or to associated allegations like exclusive dealing."

In conclusion, the dissenting commissioner expressed her view that the agency’s decision to pursue the complaint "unfortunately bears out my concerns that the Commission’s 2015 statement was too vague and abbreviated to discipline Section 5 enforcement." In August 2015, the FTC released a one-page document identifying general principles that guide the agency when deciding whether to bring an action against "unfair methods of competition" that do not amount to traditional antitrust violations.

"[I]f the Commission is going to issue a policy statement in this controversial area, it should provide meaningful guidance to those subject to our jurisdiction," said Ohlhausen in dissenting from issuance of the guidance.

Korea Fair Trade Commission action. The FTC's action comes just a few weeks after the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) fined Qualcomm $865 million for allegedly coercing the execution and performance of unfair license agreements by using its chipset supply as leverage and circumventing FRAND commitments. Qualcomm said that it would file an appeal in that matter when the order became final.

Attorneys: Geoffrey M. Green for the FTC. Gary A. Bornstein and Yonatan Even (Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP) and Willard K. Tom (Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP) for Qualcomm Inc.

Companies: Qualcomm Inc.

MainStory: TopStory Antitrust FederalTradeCommissionNews

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CASES

ANTITRUST—D. Kan.: Body camera maker immune from claims it foreclosed market through bribery

By E. Darius Sturmer, J.D.

A manufacturer of law enforcement body cameras was entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine from a competitor’s claims that it violated federal and state antitrust and unfair competition laws by conspiring with and bribing numerous municipalities to buy its products. The federal district court in Kansas City, Kansas, granted a motion by the defending manufacturer—Taser International—to dismiss the claims (Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser International, Inc., January 12, 2017, Murguia, C.).

The complaining competitor—Digital Ally—alleged that the bribery scheme effectively denied it market access, and excluded others from competition as well. However, the court observed, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine "exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by private individuals, even if their intent is to eliminate competition." Moreover, once Taser raised Noerr-Pennington, the burden shifted to Digital Ally to establish that the doctrine did not apply, the court said.

Noerr-Pennington exceptions. Pointing out that higher federal courts have rejected proposed conspiracy, bribery, and commercial exceptions to the doctrine, the court concluded that Taser remained immune for its actions intended to influence municipalities’ decisions. This conclusion was dictated, in the court’s view, by a Tenth Circuit decision holding that insurers accused of a rate-fixing conspiracy were immune under Noerr-Pennington regardless of whether the allegations involved bribery or corruption. Further, the Supreme Court’s language addressing bribery and corruption in the context of the doctrine in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Omni") was not dicta and was not abrogated by a later decision that arguably diminished the impact of Omni.

Other claims. Digital Ally’s inability to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity was also dispositive of its claims under the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, which is construed in harmony with the federal statute, the court noted. In addition, its failure to plead any costs and prices for the products at issue was fatal to its predatory pricing claim under the California Unfair Trade Practices Act. Finally, a California Unfair Competition Law claim derivative of the other failed claims had to be dismissed as well.

The case is No. 16-2032.

Attorneys: Adam P. Seitz (Erise IP, PA) and James F.B. Daniels (McDowell, Rice, Smith & Buchanan, PC) for Digital Ally, Inc. B. Trent Webb (Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP) for Taser International, Inc.

Companies: Digital Ally, Inc.; Taser International, Inc.

Cases: Antitrust KansasNews

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CONSUMER PROTECTION—M.D. Fla.: Non-party compelled to produce company documents

By Edward L. Puzzo, J.D.

A non-party who produced some but not all of the documents requested through a subpoena duces tecum could not be held in contempt, and was not required to produce certain personal financial records; however, he was required to produce all records related to his former company, the federal district court in Tampa has ruled (FTC v. Roca Labs, Inc., January 13, 2017, McCoun, T.).

In September 2014, the FTC filed a complaint against Roca Labs, a Florida-based marketer of weight-loss supplements, charging that it had made baseless claims about its products and then threatened to enforce "gag clause" provisions to stop consumers from posting negative reviews and testimonials online. In addition to the FTC’s unfairness charges based on the defendants’ enforcement of its gag clauses, the FTC alleged that the defendants: (1) made weight-loss claims that were false or unsubstantiated; (2) failed to disclose that they compensated users who posted positive reviews; and (3) violated consumers’ privacy by disclosing personal health information to payment processors, banks, and in public court filings. In October 2015, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the defendants.

In November 2016, Roca Labs issued a subpoena duces tecum to non-party Nicholas Peters, seeking various records and documents relating to the operations of USA Distributors Service since January 1, 2014. This was followed by defendants' December 8, 2016 motion to hold Peters in contempt and seeking sanctions for his alleged failure to comply with the subpoena. Subsequently, defendants conceded that Peters had produced some, but not all, of the requested documents.

Contempt. The court found no basis for holding Peters in contempt, noting that he had produced all Pay Pal records, personal and business bank statements, most emails sought and everything in his possession related to USA Distributors Service, demonstrating reasonable efforts to comply with the requests not objected to. The court therefore denied the motion for contempt.

Additional production. Construing the motion as one to compel additional production under the subpoena, the court ordered Peters to produce, to the extent he had not already produced, all communications between Peters and USA Distributors, and all records Peters may possess reflecting money he received from the company, or funds paid out from company funds not recorded on company books, since January 1, 2014.

As to document requests related to Peters’ personal and family finances which had not been produced and were objected to—job applications, documents revealing debts owed, income information, evidence of receipt of gifts or money in excess of $100, and documents showing monies received from his wife or her family—the court found the requests overly broad, intrusive and unrelated to the claims and defenses in this case. The court therefore denied defendants' motion to compel production in this regard.

The case is No. 8:15-cv-02231-MSS-TBM.

Attorneys: Carl H. Settlemyer for the Federal Trade Commission. Suzette M. Marteny (Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP) for Roca Labs, Inc. and Roca Labs Nutraceutical USA, Inc.

Companies: Roca Labs, Inc.; Roca Labs Nutraceutical USA, Inc.

Cases: ConsumerProtection FederalTradeCommissionNews FloridaNews

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FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION—N.D. Cal.: Question of hair salon’s fee obligations to be determined by arbitrator

By Robert B. Barnett Jr., J.D.

A hair salon franchisee was required to arbitrate whether its declaratory judgment action against the franchisor was subject to arbitration because their franchise agreement’s broadly worded arbitration provision covering "any controversy or claim arising out of relating to this Agreement" applied to the question of arbitrability itself, the federal district in San Jose, California, ruled. Even though the agreement required arbitration in Boston, the court ordered that arbitration take place in the Northern District of California because a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate outside the district where the petition to compel arbitration is filed (Capelli Enterprises, Inc. v. Fantastic Sams Salons Corp., January 13, 2017, Davila, E.).

Two individuals operating a Fantastic Sams franchise filed suit against Fantastic Sams Salons Corporation seeking a declaratory judgment that the franchisees owed no further franchise fees after they closed their business five years into a 10-year franchise contract. Fantastic Sams responded by invoking the mandatory arbitration clause to arbitrate all disputes with the American Arbitration Association, and it filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit or, in the alternative, to stay the action pending arbitration.

Arbitrability. The franchisees acknowledged the arbitration provision, but they argued that a declaratory judgment action was not subject to arbitration. The question, therefore, for the court was whether arbitrability was to be determined by the trial judge or by the arbitrator. The answer, the court said, was to be found in the contract’s arbitration provision. Arbitrability is generally left to the courts unless the parties clearly provide otherwise. In this case, the arbitration provision covered "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the Agreement or with regard to its interpretation, formation or breach of any other aspect of the relationship between" the franchisees and the franchisor. That was an all-encompassing and broadly worded arbitration provision that has been determined to cover questions of arbitrability.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that incorporation of the American Arbitration Association rules was evidence of an intent to arbitrate arbitrability under Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015). The franchisees’ argument that incorporation of the AAA rules did not apply to them because they lacked business sophistication was rejected. The court noted that one franchisee was a software development engineer, and the other was a chemist. Both had multiple graduate degrees. They purchased the franchise from a previous franchisee, in a transaction involving lawyers, and, by the time the franchise agreement was renegotiated with the franchisor, they had been operating the salon for three years.

The court also rejected the franchisees’ argument that a clause in the arbitration provision giving the courts the right to enforce the provisions of the arbitration provision undermined the delegation of all matters to arbitration. The clause, the court said, merely gave the parties the right to use the court to compel arbitration or enforce any arbitration award. As a result, the court ruled that the question of arbitrability was to be determined by an arbitrator rather than by this court.

Forum selection. A discrepancy arose because the franchise agreement required arbitration in Boston but an addendum to the contract appeared to require arbitration in Orange County, California. This discrepancy need not be resolved, the court said, because the law in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate outside the district where the petition to compel arbitration is filed. Thus, the court ordered that arbitration take place in the Northern District of California. The court noted, however, that the franchisor could have avoided this outcome if it had filed its order to arbitrate in Massachusetts rather than in California.

Thus, the court granted the franchisor’s motion to compel arbitration in California and to stay the declaratory judgment action pending arbitration.

The case is No. 5:16-cv-03401-EJD.

Attorneys: Laura Maryline Tanganelli (L.M.T Law Firm) and Rares Michael Ghilezan (The Ghilezan Law Firm) for Capelli Enterprises, Inc. Calvin Eugene Davis (Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP) for Fantastic Sams Salons Corp. and Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp.

Companies: Capelli Enterprises, Inc.; Fantastic Sams Salons Corp.; Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp.

Cases: FranchisingDistribution CaliforniaNews

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RICO—D. Mass.: Borrowers’ RICO, CPA claims against mortgage lender untimely

By Mark Engstrom, J.D.

The statute of limitations barred federal RICO and Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claims that two mortgage borrowers had brought against their lender and other companies that were associated with their mortgage loan, the federal district court in Boston has ruled. All of the alleged misconduct had occurred more than four years before the plaintiffs had filed their complaint, the court determined, and the plaintiffs failed to show that the four-year limitations period for RICO claims should be tolled. Further, they failed to show that the defendants should be estopped from asserting a limitations defense. The RICO claims were therefore time barred. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that they had sent demand letters to the defendants, as required by the CPA, and concluded that the CPA claims were time barred for the same reasons that the RICO claims were time barred. The CPA claims were therefore dismissed (Harry v. American Brokers Conduit, January 12, 2017, Saylor IV, F.).

Lawsuit. The plaintiffs sued American Brokers Conduit (their mortgage lender), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS), and other companies that were involved with their mortgage loan, its subsequent assignment, and the foreclosure attempts on their home. According to the plaintiffs, their mortgage and note were both void because American Brokers was not an incorporated entity and was not licensed to do business in any state at the time of their loan.

The plaintiffs alleged that every assignment of their mortgage was therefore void and every attempt to collect on their note or foreclose on their property was therefore unauthorized. The plaintiffs sought to have their mortgage released and their original note cancelled. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages of more than $197 million.

RICO claims. The plaintiffs argued that their loan application had overstated their income and included fictitious assets, that their signatures had been forged on their mortgage and two riders, that multiple loan documents were fraudulent, and that a usurious interest rate was being charged on their loan. They also argued that, because American Brokers did not exist at the time of their loan, they never gave a valid mortgage to MERS, the purported nominee for American Brokers.

All of those actions occurred on or about the date of the loan closing (December 21, 2006), the court explained. Because the plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known about their injury no later than that date, the limitations period for their RICO claims expired on December 21, 2010—nearly five and a half years before they filed their lawsuit. Because the statute of limitations on RICO claims was four years, the RICO claims fell outside of the statutory period.

Further, the plaintiffs failed to show that the statutory period should be tolled (their allegations were conclusory, implausible, and internally inconsistent) and they failed to show that the defendants should be estopped from asserting a limitations defense (they failed to allege any facts to support the conclusion that the defendants had "lulled" them into thinking that a lawsuit did not need to be filed within the applicable statutory periods). For those reasons, neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel was applicable to their RICO claims.

CPA claims. The plaintiffs could not assert a claim under the CPA because their complaint failed to state that they had sent demand letters to the defendants, a requirement of the CPA. However, even if the plaintiffs had submitted the required demand letters, their CPA claims would still be barred under the four-year statute of limitations for CPA claims.

Like their RICO claims, the plaintiffs’ CPA claims were premised on the allegedly fraudulent nature of the transaction that occurred on the date of their closing. For the same reason that their RICO claims were time barred, their CPA claims were time barred. And for similar reasons, the plaintiffs failed show that: (1) the limitations period for their CPA claims should be tolled or (2) the defendants should be estopped from asserting a limitations defense.

The case is No. 16-10895-FDS.

Attorneys: Tina L. Sherwood (Law Office of Tina L. Sherwood) for Timothy C. Harry. Douglas L. Whitaker (Fidelity National Law Group) for Fidelity National Title Group Inc. and Fidelity National Financial, Inc. Samuel C. Bodurtha (Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP) for American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.; Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Homeward Residential, Inc.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.

Companies: American Brokers Conduit; Apex Mortgage Services; Fidelity National Title Group; Fidelity National Financial, Inc.; American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.; Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Homeward Residential, Inc.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

Cases: RICO StateUnfairTradePractices MassachusettsNews

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NEWS

ANTITRUST NEWS: Agencies release updated ‘Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation’

By Jeffrey May, J.D.

The Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the FTC have updated their guidance to businesses engaged in international activities on questions that concern the agencies’ international enforcement policy as well as their related investigative tools and cooperation with foreign authorities. Last Friday, the agencies released their revised "Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation."

The guidance replaces the 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations. According to the agencies, the update was intended to address the increasingly important role that the federal antitrust laws have played over the last two decades in protecting from anticompetitive conduct consumers and businesses purchasing in U.S. import commerce and exporters selling in U.S. export commerce. The impact of greater antitrust enforcement by foreign agencies also was noted.

In a joint statement, the agencies identified some of the changes:

·        adding a chapter on international cooperation, which addresses the agencies’ investigative tools, confidentiality safeguards, the legal basis for cooperation, types of information exchanged and waivers of confidentiality, remedies, and special considerations in criminal investigations;

·        updating the discussion of the application of U.S. antitrust law to conduct involving foreign commerce, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), foreign sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign compulsion, the act of state doctrine and petitioning of sovereigns, in light of developments in both the law and the Agencies’ practice; and

·        providing revised illustrative examples focused on the types of issues most commonly encountered. The guidance added a discussion of international cooperation, addressing the agencies’ investigative tools, confidentiality safeguards, the legal basis for cooperation, types of information exchanged, and waivers of confidentiality, remedies and special considerations in criminal investigations.

The proposed revisions were announced in November. The agencies received comments from practitioners, academics, economists, and other stakeholders. Among the comments were suggestions for improvement from the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) and the American Bar Association (ABA) Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law.

AAI commended the FTC and Justice Department for undertaking the proposed updates, and noted its general agreement with the proposed changes. Nevertheless, AAI raised a number of concerns, including appropriately defining the scope of the import commerce exclusion under the FTAIA and concerns about the consistency in the language used to articulate the governing standard for "directness" under the domestic effects exception of the FTAIA.

The ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law also suggested some changes to the guidelines to "improve their ultimate utility." In particular, the Sections ask the agencies to revise Chapter 3 to clarify the application of the FTAIA, and whether it is a substantive element of a claim or is an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. The thresholds for the FTAIA effects exception should also be clarified, and the Sections asked that the agencies make clear that the "gives rise to" clause of the effects exception will be interpreted consistently with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics.

News: Antitrust AntitrustDivisionNews FederalTradeCommissionNews

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ANTITRUST NEWS: High Court denies banks’ request for review of Second Circuit LIBOR decision

By Jeffrey May, J.D.

The nation’s leading banks were unable to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in on the viability of antitrust claims challenging an alleged conspiracy to manipulate U.S. Dollar (USD) LIBOR. The banks’ petition for review was denied today. Left standing is a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York City, holding that purchasers of financial instruments that carried a rate of return indexed to the USD LIBOR had alleged an antitrust violation and vacating judgment in favor of the defending banks on the ground that the complaints failed to plead antitrust injury (Bank of America Corp. v. Gelboim, Dkt. 16-545).

The banks contended that the Second Circuit’s decision contravened Supreme Court precedent holding that only impairments of competition violate the antitrust laws. They suggested that any manipulation of the USD LIBOR-setting process could not impair or displace competition because USD LIBOR has never been the product of competition between banks or other market participants. Furthermore, the banks argued that the conspiracy pleading standard adopted by the Second Circuit conflicts with the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Attorneys: Seth P. Waxman (Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) for Bank of America Corp. Thomas C. Rice (Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP) for JPMorgan Entities. Andrew A. Waxman (Covington & Burling LLP) for Citibank Entities.

Companies: Bank of America Corp.; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.; Citibank, N.A.

News: Antitrust

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CONSUMER PROTECTION NEWS: FTC calls out illegal robocall operations

By Jody Coultas, J.D.

A number of participants in a "massive" robocall telemarketing operations that has been calling consumers on the National Do Not Call (DNC) Registry since at least 2012 have agreed to court orders that permanently ban them from making robocalls, making any calls to numbers listed on the DNC Registry, violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), and/or assisting others in doing so, according to an announcement by the FTC (FTC v. Ramsey, FTC File No. 132 3254, Case No. 9:17-CV-80032-KAM; FTC v. Jones, FTC File No. 152 3152, Case No. 8:17-cv-00058).

The FTC filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Justin Ramsey for allegedly illegally making millions of robocalls in 2012 and 2013 to consumers on the DNC Registry selling home security systems or generating leads for home security installation companies. In just one week, the Ramsey operation allegedly made more than 1.3 million illegal calls. Ramsey has allegedly continued to violate the TSR, placing at least 800,000 calls to numbers listed on the DNC Registry in April and May of 2016.

Two of Ramsey’s former business partners and their three companies have agreed to bans and a $1.4 million judgment, which is suspended based on the defendants’ inability to pay.

In a related complaint filed in in the federal district court in Los Angeles, the FTC charged nine individuals and 10 corporate entities with operating robocalling enterprises allegedly controlled by Aaron Michael Jones. Over seven years, the defendants made or helped to make billions of robocalls selling extended auto warranties, search engine optimization services, and home security systems, or generated leads for companies selling those goods and services.

Seven of the nine individual defendants and Local Lighthouse Corp. have agreed to bans on robocalling, DNC and TSR violations, and a suspended $9.9 million monetary judgment.

News: ConsumerProtection FederalTradeCommissionNews

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LAW FIRM NEWS: Cravath litigator nominated to serve as associate judge on New York Court of Appeals

New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo has nominated Rowan D. Wilson to serve as an associate judge on the State Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, the firm has announced. Wilson is a litigation partner in the New York office of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, where he has broad practice in complex litigation, including antitrust and competition, intellectual property, contract, securities fraud, entertainment and media, civil rights, and employment matters.

Wilson has been nominated to fill the vacancy created last year by the retirement of the Honorable Eugene Pigott. He is the seventh person that Governor Cuomo has nominated to serve on the New York State Court of Appeals. The nomination, which was entered on January 15, is subject to confirmation by the New York State Senate.

Over the course of his career, Wilson has represented multinational financial services corporations, Fortune 500 companies, and other major organizations on high-profile issues throughout the United States and in a variety of venues including the United States Supreme Court and federal and state appellate and trial courts nationwide. He joined Cravath in 1986 and became a partner in 1992.

Founded in 1819, Cravath, Swaine & Moore is one of the premier U.S. law firms with over 470 attorneys located in offices in New York City and London. The firm’s practice areas include general corporate, mergers and acquisitions, securities, banking, litigation, tax, executive compensation, and trusts and estates.

Attorneys: Rowan D. Wilson (Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP).

News: IndustryNewsTrends Antitrust

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In the News

LAW FIRMS

Covington & Burling LLP |Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP [1, 2] |Erise IP, PA |Fidelity National Law Group |Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP |Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP |L.M.T Law Firm |Law Office of Tina L. Sherwood |McDowell, Rice, Smith & Buchanan, PC |Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP |Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP |Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP |Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP |The Ghilezan Law Firm |Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

COMPANIES

American Brokers Conduit | American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. | Apex Mortgage Services | Bank of America Corp. | Capelli Enterprises, Inc. | Citibank, N.A. | Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. | Digital Ally, Inc. | Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. | Fantastic Sams Salons Corp. | Fidelity National Financial, Inc. | Fidelity National Title Group | Homeward Residential, Inc. | JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. | Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. | Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC | Qualcomm Inc. | Roca Labs Nutraceutical USA, Inc. | Roca Labs, Inc. | Taser International, Inc.

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